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We employ Clarkson and Schneider’s “hyperproperties” to classify various verification problems
of quantitative information flow. The results of this paper unify and extend the previous results
on the hardness of checking and inferring quantitative information flow. In particular, we identify
a subclass of liveness hyperproperties, which we call “k-observable hyperproperties”, that can be
checked relative to a reachability oracle via self composition.
1 Introduction
We consider programs containing high security inputs and low security outputs. Informally, the quan-
titative information flow problem concerns the amount of information that an attacker can learn about
the high security input by executing the program and observing the low security output. The problem
is motivated by applications in information security. We refer to the classic by Denning [14] for an
overview.
In essence, quantitative information flow measures how secure, or insecure, a program (or a part of a
program –e.g., a variable–) is. Thus, unlike non-interference [12, 16], that only tells whether a program
is completely secure or not completely secure, a definition of quantitative information flow must be able
to distinguish two programs that are both interfering but have different levels of security.
For example, consider the programs M1 ≡ if H = g then O := 0 else O := 1 and M2 ≡ O := H .
In both programs, H is a high security input and O is a low security output. Viewing H as a password,
M1 is a prototypical login program that checks if the guess g matches the password. By executing M1,
an attacker only learns whether H is equal to g, whereas she would be able to learn the entire content
of H by executing M2. Hence, a reasonable definition of quantitative information flow should assign a
higher quantity to M2 than to M1, whereas non-interference would merely say that M1 and M2 are both
interfering, assuming that there are more than one possible value of H .
Researchers have attempted to formalize the definition of quantitative information flow by appealing
to information theory. This has resulted in definitions based on the Shannon entropy [14, 9, 22], the min
entropy [29], and the guessing entropy [18, 4]. All of these definitions map a program (or a part of a
program) onto a non-negative real number, that is, they define a function X such that given a program M,
X (M) is a non-negative real number. (Concretely, X is SE[µ ] for the Shannon-entropy-based definition
with the distribution µ , ME[µ ] for the min-entropy-based definition with the distribution µ , and GE[µ ]
for the guessing-entropy-based definition with the distribution µ .)
In a previous work [33, 32], we have proved a number of hardness results on checking and infer-
ring quantitative information flow (QIF) according to these definitions. A key concept used to connect
the hardness results to QIF verification problems was the notion of k-safety, which is an instance in a
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SE[U ] ME[U ] GE[U ]
LBP Liveness Liveness Liveness
UBP Liveness Safety Safety
LBP constant bound Liveness k-observable k-observable
UBP constant bound Liveness k-safety [32] k-safety [32]
Table 1: A summary of hyperproperty classifications
collection of the class of program properties called hyperproperties [11]. In this paper, we make the
connection explicit by providing a fine-grained classification of QIF problems, utilizing the full range of
hyperproperties. This has a number of benefits, summarized below.
1.) A unified view on the hardness results of QIF problems.
2.) New insights into hyperproperties themselves.
3.) A straightforward derivation of some complexity theoretic results.
Regarding 1.), we focus on two types of QIF problems, an upper-bounding problem that checks if QIF
of a program is bounded above by the given number, and a lower-bounding problem that checks if QIF is
bounded below by the given number. Then, for each QIF definitions SE, GE, ME, we classify whether or
not they are safety hyperproperty, k-safety hyperproperty, liveness hyperproperty, or k-observable hyper-
property (and give a bound on k for k-safe/k-observable). Safety hyperproperty, k-safety hyperproperty,
liveness hyperproperty, and observable hyperproperty are classes of hyperproperties defined by Clarkson
and Schneider [11]. In this paper, we identify new classes of hyperproperties, k-observable hyperprop-
erty, that is useful for classifying QIF problems. k-observable hyperproperty is a subclass of observable
hyperproperties, and observable hyperproperty is a subclass of liveness hyperproperties.1 We focus on
the case the input distribution is uniform, that is, µ = U , as showing the hardness for a specific case
amounts to showing the hardness for the general case. Also, checking and inferring QIF under the uni-
formly distributed inputs has received much attention [17, 4, 19, 8, 22, 9], and so, the hardness for the
uniform case is itself of research interest.2
Regarding 2.), we show that the k-observable subset of the observable hyperproperties is amenable
to verification via self composition [5, 13, 30, 26, 31], much like k-safety hyperproperties, and identify
which QIF problems belong to that family. We also show that the hardest of the QIF problems (but nev-
ertheless one of the most popular) can only be classified as a general liveness hyperproperty, suggesting
that liveness hyperproperty is a quite permissive class of hyperproperties.
Regarding 3.), we show that many complexity theoretic results for QIF problems of loop-free boolean
programs can be derived from their hyperproperties classifications [33, 32]. We also prove new com-
plexity theoretic results, including the (implicit state) complexity results for loop-ful boolean programs,
complementing the recently proved explicit state complexity results [7].
Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the hyperproperties classifications and computational complexities
of upper/lower-bounding problems. We abbreviate lower-bounding problem, upper-bounding problem,
and boolean programs to LBP, UBP, and BP, respectively. The “constant bound” rows correspond to
bounding problems with a constant bound (whereas the plain bounding problems take the bound as an
input).
The proofs omitted from the paper appear in the extended report [35].
1Technically, only non-empty observable hyperproperties are liveness hyperproperties.
2In fact, computing QIF under other input distributions can sometimes be reduced to this case [3]. See also Section 5.3.
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SE[U ] ME[U ] GE[U ]
LBP for BP PSPACE-hard PSPACE-complete PSPACE-complete
UBP for BP PSPACE-hard PSPACE-complete PSPACE-complete
LBP for loop-free BP PP-hard PP-hard PP-hard
UBP for loop-free BP PP-hard [32] PP-hard [32] PP-hard [32]
LBP for loop-free BP, constant bound Unknown NP-complete NP-complete
UBP for loop-free BP, constant bound Unknown coNP-complete coNP-complete
Table 2: A summary of computational complexities
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Quantitative Information Flow
We introduce the information theoretic definitions of QIF that have been proposed in literature. First,
we review the notion of the Shannon entropy [28], H [µ ](X), which is the average of the information
content, and intuitively, denotes the uncertainty of the random variable X . And, we review the notion of
the conditional entropy, H [µ ](Y |Z), which denotes the uncertainty of Y after knowing Z.
Definition 2.1 (Shannon Entropy and Conditional Entropy) Let X be a random variable with sample
space X and µ be a probability distribution associated with X (we write µ explicitly for clarity). The
Shannon entropy of X is defined as
H [µ ](X) = ∑
x∈X
µ(X = x) log 1µ(X = x)
Let Y and Z be random variables with sample space Y and Z, respectively, and µ ′ be a probability
distribution associated with Y and Z. Then, the conditional entropy of Y given Z is defined as
H [µ ](Y |Z) = ∑
z∈Z
µ(Z = z)H [µ ](Y |Z = z)
where
H [µ ](Y |Z = z) = ∑y∈Y µ(Y = y|Z = Z) log 1µ(Y=y|Z=z)
µ(Y = y|Z = z) = µ(Y=y,Z=z)µ(Z=z)
(The logarithm is in base 2.)
Let M be a program that takes a high security input H , and gives the low security output trace O.
For simplicity, we restrict to programs with just one variable of each kind, but it is trivial to extend the
formalism to multiple variables (e.g., by letting the variables range over tuples or lists). Also, for the
purpose of the paper, unobservable (i.e., high security) output traces are irrelevant, and so we assume
that the only program output is the low security output trace. Let µ be a probability distribution over the
values of H . Then, the semantics of M can be defined by the following probability equation. (We restrict
to deterministic programs in this paper.)
µ(O = o) = ∑
h ∈H
M(h) = o
µ(H = h)
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Here, M(h) denotes the infinite low security output trace of the program M given a input h, and M(h) = o
denotes the output trace of M given h that is equivalent to o. In this paper, we adopt the termination-
insensitive security observation model, and let the outputs o and o′ be equivalent iff ∀i∈ω .oi =⊥∨o′i =
⊥∨oi = o
′
i where o and oi denotes the ith element of o, and⊥ is the special symbol denoting termination.3
In this paper, programs are represented by sets of traces, and traces are represented by lists of stores
of programs. More formally,
M(h) is equal to o iff σ0;σ1; . . . ;σi; . . . ∈ M
where σ0(H) = h and ∀i≥ 1.σi(O) = oi (oi denotes the ith element of o)
Here, σ denotes a store that maps variables to values. Because we restrict all programs to determin-
istic programs, every program M satisfies the following condition: For any trace −→σ ,−→σ ′ ∈ M, we have
σ0(H) = σ ′0(H)⇒
−→σ =−→σ ′ where σ0 and σ ′0 denote the first elements of
−→σ and −→σ ′, respectively. Now,
we are ready to define Shannon-entropy-based quantitative information flow.
Definition 2.2 (Shannon-Entropy-based QIF [14, 9, 22]) Let M be a program with a high security in-
put H, and a low security output trace O. Let µ be a distribution over H. Then, the Shannon-entropy-
based quantitative information flow is defined
SE[µ ](M) = H [µ ](H)−H [µ ](H|O)
Intuitively, H [µ ](H) denotes the initial uncertainty and H [µ ](H|O) denotes the remaining uncertainty
after knowing the low security output trace. (For space, the paper focuses on the low-security-input free
definitions of QIF.)
As an example, consider the programs M1 and M2 from Section 1. For concreteness, assume that
g is the value 01 and H ranges over the space {00,01,10,11}. Let U be the uniform distribution over
{00,01,10,11}, that is, U(h) = 1/4 for all h ∈ {00,01,10,11}. The results are as follows.
SE[U ](M1) = H [U ](H)−H [U ](H|O) = log4− 34 log3 ≈ .81128
SE[U ](M2) = H [U ](H)−H [U ](H|O) = log4− log1 = 2
Consequently, we have that SE[U ](M1)≤ SE[U ](M2), but SE[U ](M2) 6≤ SE[U ](M1). That is, M1 is more
secure than M2 (according to the Shannon-entropy based definition with uniformly distributed inputs),
which agrees with our intuition.
Next, we introduce the min entropy, which has recently been suggested as an alternative measure for
quantitative information flow [29].
Definition 2.3 (Min Entropy) Let X and Y be random variables, and µ be an associated probability
distribution. Then, the min entropy of X is defined
H∞[µ ](X) = log
1
V [µ ](X)
and the conditional min entropy of X given Y is defined
H∞[µ ](X |Y ) = log
1
V [µ ](X |Y )
3Here, we adopt the trace based QIF formalization of [23].
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where
V [µ ](X) = maxx∈X µ(X = x)
V [µ ](X |Y = y) = maxx∈X µ(X = x|Y = y)
V [µ ](X |Y ) = ∑y∈Y µ(Y = y)V [µ ](X |Y = y)
Intuitively, V [µ ](X) represents the highest probability that an attacker guesses X in a single try. We
now define the min-entropy-based definition of QIF.
Definition 2.4 (Min-Entropy-based QIF [29]) Let M be a program with a high security input H, and
a low security output trace O. Let µ be a distribution over H. Then, the min-entropy-based quantitative
information flow is defined
ME[µ ](M) = H∞[µ ](H)−H∞[µ ](H|O)
Computing the min-entropy based quantitative information flow for our running example programs
M1 and M2 from Section 1 with the uniform distribution, we obtain,
ME[U ](M1) = H∞[U ](H)−H∞[U ](H|O) = log4− log2 = 1
ME[U ](M2) = H∞[U ](H)−H∞[U ](H|O) = log4− log1 = 2
Again, we have that ME[U ](M1) ≤ ME[U ](M2) and ME[U ](M2) 6≤ ME[U ](M1), and so M2 is deemed
less secure than M1.
The third definition of quantitative information flow treated in this paper is the one based on the
guessing entropy [24], that has also recently been proposed in literature [18, 4].
Definition 2.5 (Guessing Entropy) Let X and Y be random variables, and µ be an associated proba-
bility distribution. Then, the guessing entropy of X is defined
G [µ ](X) = ∑
1≤i≤m
i×µ(X = xi)
where {x1,x2, . . . ,xm}= X and ∀i, j.i ≤ j ⇒ µ(X = xi)≥ µ(X = x j).
The conditional guessing entropy of X given Y is defined
G [µ ](X |Y ) = ∑
y∈Y
µ(Y = y) ∑
1≤i≤m
i×µ(X = xi|Y = y)
where {x1,x2, . . . ,xm}= X and ∀i, j.i ≤ j ⇒ µ(X = xi|Y = y)≥ µ(X = x j|Y = y).
Intuitively, G [µ ](X) represents the average number of times required for the attacker to guess the
value of X . We now define the guessing-entropy-based quantitative information flow.
Definition 2.6 (Guessing-Entropy-based QIF [18, 4]) Let M be a program with a high security input
H, and a low security output trace O. Let µ be a distribution over H. Then, the guessing-entropy-based
quantitative information flow is defined
GE[µ ](M) = G [µ ](H)−G [µ ](H|O)
We test GE on the running example from Section 1 by calculating the quantities for the programs M1
and M2 with the uniform distribution.
GE[U ](M1) = G [U ](H)−G [U ](H|O) = 52 −
7
4 = 0.75
GE[U ](M2) = G [U ](H)−G [U ](H|O) = 52 −1 = 1.5
Therefore, we again have that GE[U ](M1) ≤ GE[U ](M2) and GE[U ](M2) 6≤ GE[U ](M1), and so M2
is considered less secure than M1, even with the guessing-entropy based definition with the uniform
distribution.
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2.2 Bounding Problems
We introduce the bounding problems of quantitative information flow that we classify. First, we define
the QIF upper-bounding problems. Upper-bounding problems are defined as follows: Given a program
M and a rational number q, decide if the information flow of M is less than or equal to q.
USE = {(M,q) | SE[U ](M)≤ q}
UME = {(M,q) |ME[U ](M)≤ q}
UGE = {(M,q) | GE[U ](M)≤ q}
Recall that U denotes the uniform distribution.
Next, we define lower-bounding problems. Lower-bounding problems are defined as follows: Given
a program M and a rational number q, decide if the information flow of M is greater than q.
LSE = {(M,q) | SE[U ](M)> q}
LME = {(M,q) |ME[U ](M)> q}
LGE = {(M,q) | GE[U ](M)> q}
2.3 Non Interference
We recall the notion of non-interference, which, intuitively, says that the program leaks no information.
Definition 2.7 (Non-intereference [12, 16]) A program M is said to be non-interfering iff for any h,h′ ∈
H, M(h) = M(h′).
Non-interference is known to be a special case of bounding problems that tests against 0.
Theorem 2.8 ([8, 32]) 1.) M is non-interfering iff (M,0) ∈ USE. 2.) M is non-interfering iff (M,0) ∈
UME. 3.) M is non-interfering iff (M,0) ∈UGE.
3 Liveness Hyperproperties
Clarkson and Schneider have proposed the notion of hyperproperties [11].
Definition 3.1 (Hyperproperties [11]) We say that P is a hyperproperty if P⊆P(Ψinf) where Ψinf is
the set of all infinite traces, and P(X) denote the powerset of X.
Note that hyperproperties are sets of trace sets. As such, they are more suitable for classifying informa-
tion properties than the classical trace properties which are sets of traces. For example, non-interference
is not a trace property but a hyperproperty.
Clarkson and Schneider have identified a subclass of hyperproperties, called liveness hyperproperties,
as a generalization of liveness properties. Intuitively, a liveness hyperproperty is a property that can not
be refuted by a finite set of finite traces. That is, if P is a liveness hyperproperty, then for any finite set of
finite traces T , there exists a set of traces that contains T and satisfies P. Formally, let Obs be the set of
finite sets of finite traces, and Prop be the set of sets of infinite traces (i.e., hyperproperties), that is,
Obs = Pfin(Ψfin)
Prop = P(Ψinf)
(Here, Pfin(X) denotes the finite subsets of X , Ψfin denotes the set of finite traces.) Let ≤ be the
relation over Obs×Prop such that
S ≤ T iff ∀t ∈ S.∃t ′.t ◦ t ′ ∈ T
where t ◦ t ′ is the sequential composition of t and t ′. Then,
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Definition 3.2 (Liveness Hyperproperties [11]) We say that a hyperproperty P is a liveness hyperprop-
erty if for any set of traces S ∈Obs, there exists a set of traces S′ ∈ Prop such that S ≤ S′ and S′ ∈ P.
Now, we state the first main result of the paper: the lower-bounding problems are liveness hyper-
properties.4 We note that, because QIF is restricted to that of deterministic programs in this paper, the
results on bounding problems are for hyperproperties of deterministic systems.5
Theorem 3.3 LSE, LME, and LGE are liveness hyperproperties.
The proof follows from the fact that, for any program M, there exists a program M′ containing all the
observations of M and has an arbitrary large information flow.6
We show that the upper-bounding problem for Shannon-entropy based quantitative information flow
is also a liveness hyperproperty.
Theorem 3.4 USE is a liveness hyperproperty.
The theorem follows from the fact that we can lower the amount of the information flow by adding traces
that have the same output trace. Therefore, for any program M, there exists M′ having more observation
than M such that SE[U ](M′)≤ q.
3.1 Observable Hyperproperties
Clarkson and Schneider [11] have identified a class of hyperproperties, called observable hyperproper-
ties, to generalize the notion of observable properties [2] to sets of traces.7
Definition 3.5 (Observable Hyperproperties [11]) We say that P is a observable hyperproperty if for
any set of traces S ∈ P, there exists a set of traces T ∈ Obs such that T ≤ S, and for any set of traces
S′ ∈ Prop, T ≤ S′⇒ S′ ∈ P.
We call T in the above definition an evidence.
Intuitively, observable hyperproperty is a property that can be verified by observing a finite set of
finite traces. We prove a relationship between observable hyperproperties and liveness hyperproperties.
Theorem 3.6 Every non-empty observable hyperproperty is a liveness hyperproperty.
Proof: Let P be a non-empty observable hyperproperty. It must be the case that there exists a set of
traces M ∈ P. Then, there exists T ∈ Obs such that T ≤ M and ∀M′ ∈ Prop.T ≤ M′ ⇒ M′ ∈ P. For
any set of traces S ∈ Obs, there exists M′ ∈ Prop such that S ≤ M′. Then, we have M∪M′ ∈ P, because
T ≤M∪M′. Therefore, P is a liveness hyperproperty. ✷
We note that the empty set is not a liveness hyperproperty but an observable hyperproperty.
We show that lower-bounding problems for min-entropy and guessing-entropy are observable hyper-
properties.
Theorem 3.7 LME is an observable hyperproperty.
Theorem 3.8 LGE is an observable hyperproperty.
4We implicitly extend the notion of hyperproperties to classify hyperproperties that take programs and rational numbers.
See [32].
5This is done simply by restricting Obs and Prop to those of deterministic systems. See [11] for detail.
6Here, we assume that the input domains are not bounded. Therefore, we can construct a program that leaks more high-
security inputs by enlarging the input domain. Hyperproperty classifications of bounding problems with bounded domains
appear in Section 5.1.
7Roughly, an observable property is a set of traces having a finite evidence prefix such that any trace having the prefix is
also in the set.
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Theorem 3.7 follows from the fact that, if (M,q) ∈ LME, then M contains an evidence of LME. This
follows from the fact that when a program M′ contains at least as much observation as M, ME[U ](M)≤
ME[U ](M′) (cf. Lemma 3.15). Theorem 3.8 is proven in a similar manner.
We show that neither of the bounding problems for Shannon-entropy are observable hyperproperties.
Theorem 3.9 Neither USE nor LSE is an observable hyperproperty.
We give the intuition of the proof for USE. Suppose SE[U ](M) ≤ q. M does not provide an evidence of
SE[U ](M) ≤ q, because for any potential evidence, we can raise the amount of the information flow by
adding traces that have disjoint output traces. The result for LSE is shown in a similar manner.
It is interesting to note that the bounding problems of SE can only be classified as general liveness
hyperproperties (cf. Theorem 3.3 and 3.4) even though SE is often the preferred definition of QIF in
practice [14, 9, 22]. This suggests that approximation techniques may be necessary for checking and
inferring Shannon-entropy-based QIF.
3.2 K-Observable Hyperproperties
We define k-observable hyperproperty that refines the notion of observable hyperproperties. Informally,
a k-observable hyperproperty is a hyperproperty that can be verified by observing k finite traces.
Definition 3.10 (K-Observable Hyperproperties) We say that a hyperproperty P is a k-observable hy-
perproperty if for any set of traces S ∈ P, there exists T ∈ Obs such that T ≤ S, |T | ≤ k, and for any set
of traces S′ ∈ Prop, T ≤ S′⇒ S′ ∈ P.
Clearly, any k-observable hyperproperty is an observable hyperproperty.
We note that k-observable hyperproperties can be reduced to 1-observable hyperproperties by a sim-
ple program transformation called self composition [5, 13].
Definition 3.11 (Parallel Self Composition [11]) Parallel self composition of S is defined as follows.
S×S = {(s[0],s′[0]);(s[1],s′ [1]);(s[2],s′ [2]); · · · | s,s′ ∈ S}
where s[i] denotes the ith element of s.
Then, a k-product parallel self composition (simply self composition henceforth) is defined as Sk.
Theorem 3.12 Every k-observable hyperproperty can be reduced to a 1-observable hyperproperty via a
k-product self composition.
As an example, consider the following hyperproperty. The hyperproperty is the set of programs that re-
turn 1 and 2 for some inputs. Intuitively, the hyperproperty expresses two good things happen (programs
return 1 and 2) for programs.
{M | ∃h,h′.M(h) = 1∧M(h′) = 2}
This is a 2-observable hyperproperty as any program containing two traces, one having 1 as the output
and the other having 2 as the output, satisfies it.
We can check the above property by self composition. (Here, || denotes a parallel composition.)
M′(H,H ′) ≡ O := M(H) || O′ := M(H ′) || assert(¬(O= 1∧O′ = 2))
Clearly, M satisfies the property iff the assertion failure is reachable in the above program, that is, iff the
predicate O = 1∧O′ = 2 holds for some inputs H,H ′. (Note that, for convenience, we take an assertion
failure to be a “good thing”.)
We show that neither the lower-bounding problem for min-entropy nor the lower-bounding problem
for guessing-entropy is a k-observable hyperproperty for any k.
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Theorem 3.13 Neither LME nor LGE is a k-observable property for any k.
However, if we let q be a constant, then we obtain different results. First, we show that the lower-
bounding problem for min-entropy-based quantitative information flow under a constant bound q, is a
⌊2q⌋+1-observable hyperproperty.
Theorem 3.14 Let q be a constant. Then, LME is a ⌊2q⌋+1-observable hyperproperty.
The theorem follows from Lemma 3.15 below which states that min-entropy based quantitative infor-
mation flow under the uniform distribution coincides with the logarithm of the number of output traces.
That is, (M,q) ∈LME iff there is an evidence in M containing ⌊2q⌋+1 disjoint outputs.
Lemma 3.15 ([29]) ME[U ](M) = log |{o | ∃h.M(h) = o}|
Next, we show that the lower-bounding problem for guessing-entropy-based quantitative information
flow under a constant bound q is a ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q⌋+1-observable hyperproperty.
Theorem 3.16 Let q be a constant. Then, LGE is a ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q⌋+1-observable hyperproperty.
The proof of the theorem is similar to that of Theorem 3.14, in that the size of the evidence set can be
computed from the bound q.
3.3 Computational Complexities
We prove computational complexities of LME and LGE by utilizing their hyperproperty classifications.
Following previous work [33, 32, 7], we focus on boolean programs.
First, we introduce the syntax of boolean programs. The semantics of boolean programs is standard.
We call boolean programs without while statements loop-free boolean programs.
M ::= x := ψ | M0;M1 | if ψ then M0 else M1 | while ψ do M | skip
φ ,ψ ::= true | x | φ ∧ψ | ¬φ
Figure 1: The syntax of boolean programs
In this paper, we are interested in the computational complexity with respect to the syntactic size
of the input program (i.e., “implicit state complexity”, as opposed to [7] which studies complexity over
programs represented as explicit states).
We show that the lower-bounding problems for min-entropy and guessing-entropy are PP-hard.
Theorem 3.17 LME and LGE for loop-free boolean programs are PP-hard.
The theorem is proven by a reduction from MAJSAT, which is a PP-hard problem. PP is the set of
decision problems solvable by a polynomial-time nondeterministic Turing machine which accepts the
input iff more than half of the computation paths accept. MAJSAT is the problem of deciding, given a
boolean formula φ over variables −→x , if there are more than 2|−→x |−1 satisfying assignments to φ .
Next, we show that if q be a constant, the upper-bounding problems for min-entropy and guessing-
entropy become NP-complete.
Theorem 3.18 Let q be a constant. Then, LME and LGE are NP-complete for loop-free boolean pro-
grams.
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NP-hardness is proven by a reduction from SAT , which is a NP-complete problem. The proof that LME
and LGE for a constant q are in NP follows from the fact that LME and LGE are k-observable hyper-
properties for some k. We give the proof intuition for LME. Recall that k-observable hyperproperties can
be reduced to 1-observable hyperproperties via self composition. Consequently, it is possible to decide
if the information flow of a given program M is greater than q by checking if the predicate of the assert
statement is violated for some inputs in the following program.
M′(H1,H2, . . . ,Hn)≡
O1 := M(H1);O2 := M(H2); . . . ;On := M(Hn);
assert(
∨
i, j∈{1,...,n}(Oi = O j∧ i 6= j))
where n = ⌊2q⌋+1. Let φ be the weakest precondition of O1 := M(H1);O2 := M(H2); . . . ;On := M(Hn)
with respect to the post condition
∨
i, j∈{1,...,n}(Oi =O j∧ i 6= j). Then, ME[U ](M)> q iff ¬φ is satisfiable.
Because a weakest precondition of a loop-free boolean program is a polynomial size boolean formula
over the boolean variables representing the inputs8, deciding ME[U ](M)> q is reducible to SAT.
For boolean programs (with loops), LME and LGE are PSPACE-complete, and LSE is PSPACE-hard
(the tight upper-bound is open for LSE).
Theorem 3.19 LME and LGE are PSPACE-complete for boolean programs.
Theorem 3.20 LSE is PSPACE-hard for boolean programs.
4 Safety Hyperproperties
Clarkson and Schneider [11] have proposed safety hyperproperties, a subclass of hyperproperties, as a
generalization of safety properties. Intuitively, a safety hyperproperty is a hyperproperty that can be
refuted by observing a finite set of finite traces.
Definition 4.1 (Safety Hyperproperties [11]) We say that a hyperproperty P is a safety hyperproperty
if for any set of traces S 6∈ P, there exists a set of traces T ∈ Obs such that T ≤ S, and ∀S′ ∈ Prop.T ≤
S′⇒ S′ 6∈ P.
We classify some upper-bounding problems as safety hyperproperties.
Theorem 4.2 UME and UGE are safety hyperproperties.
Next, we review the definition of k-safety hyperproperties [11], which refines the notion of safety hy-
perproperties. Informally, a k-safety hyperproperty is a hyperproperty which can be refuted by observing
k number of finite traces.
Definition 4.3 (K-Safety Hyperproperties [11]) We say that a hyperproperty P is a k-safety property
if for any set of traces S 6∈ P, there exists a set of traces T ∈ Obs such that T ≤ S, |T | ≤ k, and ∀S′ ∈
Prop.T ≤ S′⇒ S′ 6∈ P.
Note that 1-safety hyperproperty is just the standard safety property, that is, a property that can be refuted
by observing a finite execution trace. The notion of k-safety hyperproperties first came into limelight
when it was noticed that non-interference is a 2-safety hyperproperty, but not a 1-safety hyperprop-
erty [30].
A k-safety hyperproperty can be reduced to a 1-safety hyperproperty by self composition [5, 13].
8For loop-free boolean programs, a weakest precondition can be constructed in polynomial time [15, 21].
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Theorem 4.4 ([11]) k-safety hyperproperty can be reduced to 1-safety hyperproperty by self composi-
tion.
We have shown in our previous work that UME and UGE are k-safety hyperproperties when the bound
q is fixed to a constant.
Theorem 4.5 ([32]) Let q be a constant. UME is a ⌊2q⌋+1-safety property.
Theorem 4.6 ([32]) Let q be a constant. UGE is a ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q⌋+1-safety property.
The only hyperproperty that is both a safety hyperproperty and a liveness hyperproperty is P(Ψinf),
that is, the set of all traces [11]. Consequently, neither UME nor UGE is a liveness hyperproperty.
We have also shown in the previous work that the upper-bounding problem for Shannon-entropy
based quantitative information flow is not a k-safety hyperproperty, even when q is a constant.
Theorem 4.7 ([32]) Let q be a constant. USE is not a k-safety property for any k > 0.
4.1 Computational Complexities
We prove computational complexities of upper-bounding problems by utilizing their hyperproperty clas-
sifications. As in Section 3.3, we focus on boolean programs.
First, we show that when q is a constant, UME and UGE are coNP-complete.
Theorem 4.8 Let q be a constant. Then, UME and UGE are coNP-complete for loop-free boolean pro-
grams.
coNP-hardness follows from the fact that non-interference is coNP-hard [32]. The coNP part of the
proof is similar to the NP part of Theorem 3.18, and uses the fact that UME is k-safety for a fixed q and
uses self composition. By self composition, the upper-bounding problem can be reduced to a reachability
problem (i.e., an assertion failure is unreachable for any input). To decide if ME[U ](M)≤ q, we construct
the following self-composed program M′ from the given program M.
M′(H1,H2, . . . ,Hn)≡
O1 := M(H1);O2 := M(H2); . . . ;On := M(Hn);
assert(
∨
i, j∈{1,...,n}(Oi = O j∧ i 6= j))
where n = ⌊2q⌋+ 1. Then, the weakest precondition of O1 := M(H1);O2 := M(H2); . . . ;On := M(Hn)
with respect to the post condition
∨
i, j∈{1,...,n}(Oi = O j ∧ i 6= j) is valid iff ME[U ](M) ≤ q. Because
a weakest precondition of a loop-free boolean program is a polynomial size boolean formula, and the
problem of deciding a given boolean formula is valid is a coNP-complete problem, UME is in coNP.
Like the lower-bounding problems UME and UGE for boolean programs (with loops) are PSPACE-
complete, and USE is PSPACE-hard.
Theorem 4.9 UME and UGE are PSPACE-complete for boolean programs.
Theorem 4.10 USE is PSPACE-hard for boolean programs.
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5 Discussion
5.1 Bounding Domains
The notion of hyperproperty is defined over all programs regardless of their size. (For example, non-
interference is a 2-safety property for all programs and reachability is a safety property for all programs.)
But, it is easy to show that the lower bounding problems would become “k-observable” hyperproperties
if we constrained and bounded the input domains because then the size of the semantics (i.e., the number
of traces) of such programs would be bounded by |H| (and upper bounding problems would become
“k-safety” hyperproperties [32]). In this case, the problems are trivially |H|-observable hyperproperties.
However, these bounds are high for all but very small domains, and are unlikely to lead to a practical
verification method.
5.2 Observable Hyperproperties and Observable Properties
As remarked in [11], observable hyperproperties generalize the notion of observable properties [2]. It
can be shown that there exists a non-empty observable property that is not a liveness property (e.g., the
set of all traces that starts with σ ). In contrast, Theorem 3.6 states that every non-empty observable
hyperproperty is also a liveness hyperproperty. Intuitively, this follows because the hyperproperty ex-
tension relation ≤ allows the right-hand side to contain traces that does not appear in the left-hand side.
Therefore, for any T ∈ Obs, there exists T ′ ∈ Prop that contains T and an evidence of the observable
hyperproperty.
5.3 Maximum of QIF over Distribution
Researchers have studied the maximum of QIF over the distribution. For example, channel capacity [25,
23, 27] is the maximum of the Shannon-entropy based quantitative information flow over the distribution
(i.e., maxµ SE[µ ]). Smith [29] showed that for any program without low-security inputs, the channel
capacity is equal to the min-entropy-based quantitative information flow, that is, maxµ SE[µ ] = ME[U ].
Therefore, we obtain the same hyperproperty classifications and complexity results for channel capacity
as ME[U ].
Min-entropy channel capacity and guessing-entropy channel capacity are respectively the maxi-
mums of min-entropy based and guessing-entropy based QIF over distributions (i.e., maxµ ME[µ ] and
maxµ GE[µ ]). It has been shown that maxµ ME[µ ] = ME[U ] [6, 20] and maxµ GE[µ ] = GE[U ] [34],
that is, they attain their maximums when the distributions are uniform. Therefore, they have the same
hyperproperty classifications and complexities as ME[U ] and GE[U ], which we have already analyzed in
this paper.
6 Related Work
ˇCerny´ et al. [7] have investigated the computational complexity of Shannon-entropy based QIF. For-
mally, they have defined a Shannon-entropy based QIF for interactive boolean programs, and showed
that the explicit-state computational complexity of their lower-bounding problem is PSPACE-complete.
In contrast, this paper’s complexity results are “implicit” complexity results of bounding problems of
boolean programs (i.e., complexity relative to the syntactic size of the input) some of which are obtained
by utilizing their hyperproperties classifications.
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Clarkson and Schneider [11] have classified quantitative information flow problems via hyperprop-
erties. Namely, they have shown that the problem of deciding if the channel capacity of a given program
is q, is a liveness hyperproperty. And, they have shown that an upper-bounding problem for the belief-
based QIF [10] is a safety hyperproperty. (It is possible to refine their result to show that their problem
for deterministic programs is actually equivalent to non-interference, and therefore, is a 2-safety hyper-
property [34].)
7 Conclusion
We have related the upper and lower bounding problems of quantitative information flow, for various
information theoretic definitions proposed in literature, to Clarkson and Schneider’s hyperproperties.
Hyperproperties generalize the classical trace properties, and are thought to be more suitable for classi-
fying information flow properties as they are relations over sets of program traces. Our results confirm
this by giving a fine-grained classification and showing that it gives insights into the complexity of
the QIF bounding problems. One of the contributions is a new class of hyperproperties: k-observable
hyperproperty. We have shown that k-observable hyperproperties are amenable to verification via self
composition.
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